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To view more of my manuscripts, including working papers, forthcoming papers, and published papers, please consult the following links:
***PUBLISHED RESEARCH ARTICLES*** M. L. Barnett & A. King. Good fences make good neighbors: A longitudinal analysis of an industry self-regulatory institution. Academy of Management Journal (forthcoming). M. L. Barnett. 2008. An attention-based view of real options reasoning. Academy of Management Review, 33(3): forthcoming Abstract: Real options reasoning assumes timely and effective managerial decision-making yet does not address managers’ ability to provide it. An attention-based view describes managerial behavior under varying structural conditions. I examine real options reasoning from an attention-based view. I develop several testable propositions regarding the effects of a firm’s particular concrete and contextual attention structures on the ways in which its managers notice, champion, acquire, maintain, exercise, and abandon the various real options within its portfolio. I conclude with implications for future empirical research on real options reasoning. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1010396
W. H. Starbuck, M. L. Barnett & P. Baumard. (Forthcoming). Payoffs and pitfalls of strategic learning. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Abstract: Managers and management researchers tend to assume that learning from strategic events yields benefits. Although some firms have gained competitive advantages from learning, instances are infrequent and firms that have gained persistent advantages through learning are probably quite unusual. Learning from successes has short-run benefits but eventually makes firms less capable of surviving. Learning from failures disappears in clouds of rationalization and defensive behavior. Noisy feedback about results causes people to develop very heterogeneous and often highly erroneous perceptions of firms and their environments, so it should not be surprising that strategizing is harmful as often as it is helpful. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=968464 M. L. Barnett & G. Cahill. (Forthcoming). Measure less, succeed more: A Zen approach to organisational balance and effectiveness. Philosophy of Management, 6. Abstract: Over the last decade, managers have increasingly emphasised the creation of tangible measures of intangible organisational properties. Many major corporations now include measures for intellectual capital, knowledge capital, reputational capital, and other such intangible assets on their financial ledgers. Counter to the rubric that “If it doesn’t get measured, it doesn’t get done,” we argue that some intangibles are truly intangible, and attempts to apply tangible measures to them creates undue organisational stress and harms the underlying asset. Instead, managers may better foster the growth of intangible assets by placing less emphasis on outcome measurement and more emphasis on the process. Using New York University’s Office of Community Service as a case study, we illustrate how a Zen approach can augment tangible measures to create a truly “balanced” organisational strategy. American firms have widely adopted the strict measurement practices of Japanese firms, but few have adopted the Eastern practice of Zen. A Zen approach fosters trust and provides flexibility that allows organisations to better achieve success in the long run. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=859707 M. L. Barnett & R. L. M. Dunbar. (Forthcoming). Making sense of real options reasoning: An engine of choice that backfires? In G. Hodgkinson & W. Starbuck (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Decision Making. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Introduction: Decision-makers have long sought ways to effectively yet efficiently generate strategic flexibility within their organizations so that they can quickly adapt to dynamic market conditions (e.g., Ashby, 1956). Not surprisingly, decision-makers have taken notice of claims that, through real options reasoning, one can design an organization to function as an “engine of choice” (McGrath, Ferrier & Mendelow, 2004: 86) that generates unending chains of strategic decision-making opportunities while at the same time limiting the associated costs (Bowman & Hurry, 1993). Is real options reasoning actually able to fulfill this promise? This chapter traces the development of real options reasoning (ROR) and details how problems in assessing the value of real options have made ROR as initially proposed difficult to implement. The paper then describes how in practice, instead of focusing on explicit valuation, organizations usually use analogous reasoning to develop, select and implement options that enable strategic flexibility and so enhance value. An illustrative case demonstrates how financial options can help this process by buffering core operations from changing market environments. The same illustration also shows that ROR fails to simultaneously create future choices while limiting costs. Moreover, where it does generate future choices, it does not prevent decision-makers from making poor choices. Thus, the engine of choice that ROR suggests organizations should create may in fact backfire on those decision-makers who try to implement it. For a copy, e-mail me at: mbarnett@coba.usf.edu M. L. Barnett. 2007. Stakeholder influence capacity and the variability of financial returns to corporate social responsibility. Academy of Management Review, 32(3). Abstract: Should corporations serve as agents of social change? For more than 30 years, scholars have attempted to make a "business case" that demonstrates that corporations should because they can earn positive financial returns from social responsibility. However, the business case remains unproven. This paper argues that research on the business case must account for the path dependent nature of firm-stakeholder relations, and develops the construct of stakeholder influence capacity (SIC) to fill this void. SIC helps explain why the effects of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on corporate financial performance (CFP) vary across firms and across time, and so provides a missing link in the study of the business case. This paper distinguishes CSR from related and confounded corporate resource allocations and from corporate social performance (CSP), then incorporates SIC into a conceptual framework that illustrates how acts of CSR are transformed into CFP through stakeholder relationships. This paper also develops a set of propositions to aid future research on the contingencies that produce variable financial returns to investments in CSR. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=853086 M. L. Barnett. 2007. Tarred and untarred by the same brush: Exploring interdependence in the volatility of stock returns. Corporate Reputation Review, 10(1). Abstract: When a firm suffers a major accident, its stock price is likely to become more volatile, but does this accident also increase the volatility of the stocks of rivals? Following a major accident, rivals sometimes unite through their trade association to implement an industry self-regulatory program. Do such collective efforts help to stabilize the stocks of firms in these threatened industries? This paper presents a longitudinal empirical study of the influence of a major accident by a single firm – Union Carbide's deadly poison gas leak in Bhopal, India – on the volatility of the stock prices of other chemical firms, and the influence of this industry's intensive collective efforts to recover from this major accident – the American Chemistry Council's Responsible Care Program – on the stock price volatility of these same firms. Results indicate that the volatility of the stocks of chemical firms increased after Union Carbide's tragic accident and that this volatility decreased for Responsible Care members but not for non-members. These findings suggest that a firm's stock price may be destabilized by the actions of a rival and that through cooperation with rivals, a firm may restabilize its stock price. Thus, this study provides empirical insight about the nature of the interdependent relationship among rivals and the benefits that trade associations and industry self-regulation may provide for participating, and non-participating, firms. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934833 M. L. Barnett. 2006. Finding a working balance between competitive and communal strategy. Journal of Management Studies, 43(8):1753-1773. Abstract: This paper presents a dynamic framework that describes how firms allocate limited resources between improving their competitive position relative to rivals and their communal position shared with rivals. This dynamic framework outlines how organizational field-level dynamics influence industry attractiveness and thereby alter a firm’s incentive to engage in communal strategy relative to competitive strategy. Communal strategy, in turn, can influence the institutions governing an organizational field and thereby shape industry attractiveness. Overall, the interplay between factors exogenous and endogenous to an industry cause change in an organizational field and so determine the nature of the communal environment shared by a firm and its rivals over time. Analysis of this interplay provides insight into the micro-level drivers of macro-level change, and furthers understanding of the conditions under which rivalrous firms voluntarily contribute to collective betterment of their industry despite collective rationality. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=880066 M. L. Barnett & R. M. Salomon. 2006. Beyond dichotomy: The curvilinear relationship between social responsibility and financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 27(11): 1101-22. Abstract: A central and contentious debate in many literatures concerns the relationship between financial and social performance. We advance this debate by measuring the financial-social performance link within mutual funds that practice socially responsible investing (SRI). SRI fund managers have an array of social screening strategies from which to choose. Prior studies have not addressed this heterogeneity within SRI funds. Combining modern portfolio and stakeholder theories, we hypothesize that the financial loss borne by an SRI fund due to poor diversification is offset as social screening intensifies because better managed and more stable firms are selected into its portfolio. We find support for this hypothesis through an empirical test on a panel of 61 SRI funds from 1972-2000. The results show that as the number of social screens used by an SRI fund increases, financial returns decline at first, but then rebound as the number of screens reaches a maximum. That is, we find a curvilinear relationship, suggesting that two long-competing viewpoints may be complementary. Furthermore, we find that financial performance varies with the types of social screens used. Community relations screening increased financial performance, but environmental and labor relations screening decreased financial performance. Based on our results, we suggest that literatures addressing the link between financial and social performance move toward in-depth examination of the merits of different social screening strategies, and away from the continuing debate on the financial merits of either being socially responsible or not. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=885950 M. L. Barnett, J. M. Jermier & B. A. Lafferty. 2006. Corporate reputation: The definitional landscape. Corporate Reputation Review, 9(1): 26-38. Abstract: While interest in the concept of corporate reputation has gained momentum in the last few years, a precise and commonly agreed upon definition is still lacking. This paper reviews the many definitions of corporate reputation present in the recent literature and categorizes these definitions based on their similarities and differences. The purpose of the study is to review, analyze, and evaluate prior definitional statements of corporate reputation. Our analysis led us to conclude that the cluster of meaning that looks most promising for future definitional work uses the language of assessment and specific terms such as judgment, estimation, evaluation or gauge. Based on this review work and a lexicological analysis of the concept of reputation, we propose a new definitional statement that we think adds theoretical clarity to this area of study. The statement defines corporate reputation more explicitly and narrowly, and distinguishes this concept from corporate identity, corporate image, and corporate reputation capital. It is our hope that this study and the resulting definition will provoke further scholarship devoted to developing one voice when it comes to corporate reputation as a concept. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=868492 M. L. Barnett. 2006. Waves of collectivizing: A dynamic model of competition and cooperation over the life of an industry. Corporate Reputation Review, 8(4): 272-292. Abstract: Firms pursue competitive advantage through both individual and collective strategic actions. Because of the difficulties of coordinating collective action, industries are characterized by extended periods of individual activity, punctuated by waves of collective activity. Rational and self-interested firms engage in individual activities unless disrupted by a force ample to overcome the collective action problem. At key points in the life of an industry, legitimacy challenges arise, presenting incentive to collectivize. In a legitimacy challenge, mobilized groups of constituents attempt to gain control of and change the institutional rules of the game. In order to regain control, firms gradually collectivize in a pattern akin to the resource mobilization perspective of social movement theory. I build a model and offer several testable propositions that trace the dynamic working balance between individual and collective activities within an industry during the emergence, maturity, and decline stages. Over the life of an industry, these ebbs and flows in collective activity take the form of waves of collectivizing. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=868490 M. L. Barnett. 2005. Paying attention to real options. R&D Management, 35(1): 61-72. Abstract: The strategy literature is increasingly focused on the need to create dynamic capabilities to respond with innovative product offerings in 'hypercompetitive' environments. The real options approach offers hope for managers facing such threatening environments by highlighting methods to hold options on a variety of possible future states, thereby reducing risk without bearing all the costs. However, extant real options literature, stemming from rational-based financial assumptions, does not consider attention as a limited resource. Real options are valued on the assumption that management can exploit the flexibility inherent in projects, and so require management attention to obtain their full theoretical value. This paper brings attentional constraints to bear on the real options framework and describes a conceptual framework that illustrates the real option value realization process. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=654859 M. L. Barnett, W. H. Starbuck, & P. N. Pant. 2003. Which dreams come true? Endogeneity, industry structure, and forecasting accuracy. Industrial and Corporate Change,12(4): 653-672. Abstract: Forecasts are plentiful. Accurate long-range forecasts are not. But some forecasts are more accurate than others are and a few are very accurate. In this paper, we first explore the case of Moore's Law, a forecast that has proven quite accurate for almost 40 years. We illustrate how expectations that Moore's Law will continue to be accurate actually make it accurate. Based on the insights of this case, we hypothesize that two factors facilitate such self-fulfilling forecasts and so make accuracy more possible. We test these hypotheses on a set of 3142 forecasts about US manufacturing industries during the 1970s. We find that high industry concentration and high control over the predicted variable tend to increase the accuracy of forecasts. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=617501 M. L. Barnett. 2003. Falling off the fence? A realistic appraisal of a real options approach to corporate strategy. Journal of Management Inquiry, 12(2): 185-196. Abstract: Finance's option theoretic framework has recently been extended into a prescriptive approach to corporate strategy. This "real options" approach has refocused managerial attention on the strategic value of holding flexible positions in increasingly turbulent environments. However, emerging descriptive research on real options has begun to reveal isolated examples of the problems inherent in doing so. I embed the real options approach within an organizational setting to gain a more general understanding of how the pursuit of firm-wide flexibility can carry with it unintended consequences. Drawing broadly from organization theory, I note how the normative implications of real options reasoning can sometimes lead to excessive flexibility that disrupts the internal operations of a firm and threatens its external legitimacy over time. I then discuss how a firm may alleviate some of these problems, allowing it to gain more of the benefits of a real options approach without suffering the pitfalls. I conclude with a brief summary and suggestions for future research. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=617483 A. King, M. Lenox & M L. Barnett. 2002. Strategic responses to the reputation commons problem. In A. Hoffman and M. Ventresca (eds.), Organizations, Policy, and the Natural Environment: Institutional and Strategic Perspectives. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 393-406. Abstract: Firms within an industry often find themselves tarred by the same brush. When accidents occur, stakeholders often punish both the offending firm and the entire industry. In this way, a firm's reputation may be tied to other firms, and so reputation may be a common resource shared by all members of an industry - what we term a reputation commons. As with many shared resources, an industry's reputation may be overexploited. A firm can benefit from the favorable reputation of an industry even as it takes individual actions that may harm this shared reputation. In this chapter, we explore when a reputation commons is likely to occur and discuss how firms individually and collectively respond to the problems associated with it. We propose that firms can solve the reputation commons problem by reducing the sanctioning ability of stakeholders and by privatizing reputation. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=624201 C. J. Fombrun, N. A. Gardberg & M. L. Barnett. 2000. Opportunity platforms and safety nets: Corporate citizenship and reputational risk. Business and Society Review, 105(1): 85-106. Abstract: It is argued that no simple correlation can be established between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance. The activities that generate CSP do not directly impact the company's financial performance, but instead affect the bottom line via its stock of reputational capital - the financial value of its intangible assets. It is suggested that corporate citizenship programs can be designed to help companies address reputational threats and opportunities to achieve reputational gains while mitigating reputational losses. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1088404
***PUBLISHED RESEARCH PROCEEDINGS*** M. L. Barnett & A. A. King. 2006. Good fences make good neighbors: An institutional explanation of industry self-regulation. Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings, OMT: M1-M6. Abstract: Understanding of decentralized institutions has been hampered by a lack of longitudinal research on their formation and function. We conduct a 21-year panel analysis of conditions in the chemical industry before and after the emergence of a decentralized institution. We find that a critical event created a potentially damaging industry commons, and we find evidence that a newly formed self-regulatory institution reduced the risks associated with this commons. Surprisingly, however, we find that the institution accomplished this role not by protecting member organizations from the acts of other firms, but by protecting the entire industry from the acts of member firms. Overall, our findings support a functionalist view of institution formation, where that function is to parcel the reputation of individual firms from that shared with their rivals. M. L. Barnett. 2006. Using CSR to CYA: How corporate social responsibility influences stakeholder perceptions of organizational errors. In B. Husted & J. Logsdon (eds.), Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the International Association for Business & Society, pp. 55-57. Abstract: In this paper, I seek to build a theoretical framework that explains how effectively different firms can use different types of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to influence stakeholders perceptions of and reactions to different types of errors. CSR affects the errors stakeholders notice, how they frame them, how they respond to them, and how quickly any punishment wanes. Ex ante and ex post CSR decrease the likelihood that stakeholders will notice some errors, improve the framing of those errors that are noticed, and decrease the magnitude and duration of stakeholder attacks sparked by those errors. For a copy, e-mail me at: mbarnett@coba.usf.eduM. L. Barnett & B. A. Hudson. 2006. Big & bad? A sociological perspective on the Icarus Paradox. In B. Husted & J. Logsdon (eds.), Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the International Association for Business & Society, pp. 239-241. Abstract: One of the more interesting counter-intuitive findings in organizational research is that success breeds failure. This counter-intuitive has been described in terms of core rigidities, core incompetencies, and even the Icarus Paradox. The literature on these topics has concluded that success yields overconfidence and myopia in firms and their managers, and this eventually causes failure. We augment this literature by suggesting that success breeds not only internal pathologies that cause firms to misuse their established resources over time, but also external pathologies that cause firms to lose access to new resources. In particular, success influences stakeholders’ perceptions of firms, causing firms to lose the benefits of underdog status and gain the problems of overlord status. We term this notion that success warps images of the successful, leading to their decline over time, the Helios Paradox, and suggest that dominant firms must counter naturally tendencies to succumb to both the Icarus and Helios Paradoxes if they are to remain successful over time. For a copy, e-mail me at: mbarnett@coba.usf.edu M. L. Barnett. 2005. Stakeholder influence capacity and the variability of financial returns to corporate social responsibility. In L. Ryan and J. Logsdon (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the International Association for Business & Society Proceedings, pp. 287-292. This is an early version of the paper published in Academy of Management Review in 2007. M. L. Barnett. 2004. How much does industry strategy matter? Organizational field dynamics and cooperation among rivals. Academy of Management Best Paper Proceeding, OMT: B1-B6. Abstract: This paper combines economic, political, and sociological perspectives to present a dynamic framework for understanding how a firm strategically allocates its limited resources between competitive pursuits and industry-wide cooperation. Organizational field dynamics alter a firm’s incentive to engage in industry-wide cooperation relative to competition. Periods of intensive industry-wide cooperation, in turn, alter the organizational field and thereby influence the competitive conditions facing a firm and its rivals. Periods of cooperation are unstable, varying in their duration and intensity according to the characteristics of the organizational field, industry, and firm. A set of propositions developed in this paper outlines these characteristics and illustrates how, even in the face of rivalry and the collective action problem, firm-level self-interest aggregates into patterns of industry-level collective action. Moreover, these propositions demonstrate how the interplay between factors exogenous and endogenous to an industry facilitates change within an organizational field and so determines the nature of the competitive environment facing a firm and its rivals over time. This is an early version of the paper published in Journal of Management Studies in 2006. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=624123 M. L. Barnett, J. M. Jermier & B. A. Lafferty. 2004. Theorizing corporate reputation. Proceedings of the 8th Conference on Corporate Reputation, Image, Identity and Competitiveness(CD). This is an early version of the paper published in Corporate Reputation Review in 2006. M. L. Barnett. 2003. Unringing the bell: Can industries reverse unfavorable institutional shifts triggered by their own mistakes? Southern Management Association Conference Proceedings: 800-806. Abstract: I present a study of the US chemical industry's unified efforts to reverse an unfavorable institutional shift triggered by the transgressions of one of its members. I measure changes in the industry's institutional environment from 1980 to 2000. I find that the industry's collective efforts did not directly improve institutional conditions confronting individual firms, but did help buffer firms from financial losses that commonly arise when their rivals suffer crises. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=624161 M. L. Barnett & R. M. Salomon. 2002. Unpacking social responsibility: The curvilinear relationship between social and financial performance. Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings, SIM: B1- 6. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=624124 M. L. Barnett & R. M. Salomon. 2001. Don’t get stuck in the middle: A curvilinear bridge spanning the great SRI divide. In C. P. Dunn & D. Windsor (eds.), Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the International Association for Business & Society Proceedings: 65-69. These are early versions of the paper published in Strategic Management Journal in 2006.
***PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS, REVIEW ESSAYS, AND BOOK REVIEWS*** M. L. Barnett. 2007. (Un)Learning and (Mis)education through the eyes of Bill Starbuck: An interview with Pandora’s playmate. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 6(1): 114-127. Abstract: William H. Starbuck began his academic career in the late 1950s as a doctoral student at the Carnegie Institute of Technology, working alongside Herb Simon, Jim March, and Dick Cyert. Bill ends his academic career this year as the ITT Professor of Creative Management at the Stern School of Business at New York University. In the intervening decades, Bill has held faculty positions at 20 universities, taught classes on 32 different subjects, published more than 130 articles in a variety of disciplines, served on the editorial boards of 14 journals and as editor of Administrative Science Quarterly, been elected a fellow of 5 professional societies and held the position of President of the Academy of Management, and most recently, was selected as recipient of the 2005 Academy of Management Distinguished Scholarly Contributions Award. This interview draws forth the lessons Bill has learned through his personal experiences, teaching, and research over his many decades as a leading management scholar. Bill identifies several problems that confront learning and education within the Academy of Management and those it serves, as well as those it should attempt to serve, and he offers advice on how to address these problems. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=859705 M. L. Barnett. 2006. Review of The Keystone Advantage: What the New Dynamics of Business Ecosystems Mean for Strategy, Innovation, and Sustainability by M. Iansiti & R. Levien. Academy of Management Perspectives, 20(2):88-90. For a copy, e-mail me at: mbarnett@coba.usf.edu M. L. Barnett. 2005. Giving credits where credit’s not due? Academy of Management Learning & Education, 4(2): 221-228. This is an extended review of Henry Mintzberg’s book, Managers not MBAs. Abstract: For those who are overly enamored of the MBA credential, this book is an overly lengthy but important wakeup call. Mintzberg is right that it is wrong to put a newly minted MBA, without prior management experience, directly into a significant management position. But this is not nearly as common a happenstance nor as large a threat to humanity as Mintzberg’s drawn-out attack on it implies. Moreover, the IMPM, and his admittedly biased portrayal of it, serves as a great case study of an alternative means of providing management training to well-experienced managers, but it is neither an effective replacement for the analytical training in the conventional MBA, nor is it salvation for our “society of meanness” (p. 153), wherein we have “antisocial behavior below the surface of public awareness yet above the letter of the law” (p. 152). It is just an exciting but yet unproven way to develop experienced managers from those firms that can afford it, to be provided by those schools that can support it. Let’s not read too much more into it just yet. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=880446 M. L. Barnett. 2005. Review of The SMS Blackwell Handbook of Organizational Capabilities: Emergence, Development, and Change, C. Helfat (ed.). Academy of Management Review, 30(1): 203-207. For a copy, e-mail me: mbarnett@coba.usf.edu M. L. Barnett. 2004. Are globalization and sustainability compatible? A review of the debate between the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and the International Forum on Globalization. Organization & Environment, 17(4): 523-532. Abstract: In March of 2003, the publishers of two books with contrasting perspectives sponsored a public debate about the contents of these books, and the larger issues involved. The lead authors of each of the books participated in the debate: Chad Holliday, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of DuPont, for Walking the Talk: The Business Case for Sustainable Development; and John Cavanagh, Director of the Institute for Policy Studies, for Alternatives to Economic Globalization: A Better World Is Possible. These panelists represented not only their books, but also their organizations: Holliday represented the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), of which he is past chairman, while Cavanagh represented the International Forum on Globalization (IFG), of which he is Vice President and a member of its Board of Directors. A review of these two books and a discussion of the issues involved in the debate follow. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=624162 M. L. Barnett. 2004. Kicking the black box around: A review of The Corporation. Organizational Analysis, 12(4): 419-422. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=899310 M. L. Barnett & R. M. Salomon. 2003. Throwing a curve at SRI research: A new pitch at an old debate. Organization & Environment, 16(3): 381-389. This is part of a debate with Jon Entine over research on socially responsible investing. Our argument is based on the findings we published in Strategic Management Journal in 2006. Abstract: This paper primarily focuses on Entine's assertion that SRI research is hopelessly flawed. Although SRI researchers have primarily chosen to pluck the low-hanging fruit in this line of inquiry, it is possible to obtain unbiased higher level insight. SRI research best functions as a means of helping firms and investors identify what the market wants. As Entine points out, the definition of what is and is not moral behavior for a firm is a quagmire, and the ability to measure whether socially responsible investors have forced firms to become moral is suspect. The paper also agrees with Waddock that socially responsible investors have caused firms to take certain actions that, without such pressure, they would have taken much later or not at all. However, whether these actions have made firms moral is not a debate that SRI researchers should enter. Certainly, events of late would suggest that although firms, by and large, are now more responsive to a variety of social issues, they are not moral entities, and should not be viewed as such. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=624070 M. L. Barnett & R. M. Salomon. 2003. Opening the screen door toward a middle ground on socially responsible investing. The Corporate Citizen, 3(2): 16-20. This is practitioner-focused summary of the 2006 Strategic Management Journal article. For a copy, e-mail me at: mbarnett@coba.usf.edu M. L. Barnett. 2002. From me to we . . . and back again: Returning to business as usual. Journal of Management Inquiry, 11(3): 249-252. Abstract: The events of September 11, 2001, unified our nation. But how long can this unity last? I examine the dynamics of the national shift between individualism (me) and communalism (we) on the heels of September 11 through comparison with analogous patterns in interorganizational behavior. Based on these patterns, I conclude that, despite the severity of the crisis, the United States will again return to business as usual. Link to article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=624081 M. L. Barnett & G. Cahill. 2002. A Zen approach to volunteer management. Journal of Volunteer Administration, 20(3): 41-47. This is practitioner-focused summary of the forthcoming Philosophy of Management article. For a copy, e-mail me at: mbarnett@coba.usf.edu M. L. Barnett, M. E. Boyle & N. A. Gardberg. 2000. Towards one vision, one voice: A review essay of the 3rd International Conference on Corporate Reputation, Image and Competitiveness. Corporate Reputation Review, 3(2): 101-111. For a copy, e-mail me at: mbarnett@coba.usf.edu |